Archives de catégorie : Themes

Inequality & Democracy

The exploration of links between rising social inequalities and forms of democratic decline, notably populism, is a current area of research.

The issue is complex, as social inequality, and changes in it, exist in manifold forms. Economic indicators such as income and property, or expected future income (e.g. over one’s individual life course) can be consulted. Inequalities in forms of political participation can be analysed. Socio-cultural differences; social and cultural capital, are yet another perspective. Finally, inequalities, ruptures, divides in communication and organisation must regarded – be it as an infrastructure of political representation, i.e. between representatives and represented; or between whole social milieus, i.e. social dis-integration. Ruptures in social experience and social identity must be understood in relation to these types of developments.

We are here merely citing a small number of (political-)economic indicators, which however, already, seem to make a point: at the very least, a co-incidence of a rise in socio-economic inequality and populism is given.

The following graphics are (C) of the World Inequality Database (World Inequality Report 2017, if not indicated differently). They give an idea of the rise in income inequality in some regions of the world as well as of which groups may have been in particular affected by stagnation: notably, the lower middle classes of industrialised countries.


(c) CBPP.org

Thomas Pikkety (2018) shows how centre-left parties across the industrialised countries are today no more representing low-income groups – but relatively high-income and notably, high-educated social groups. The author notes that this amounts to a double-elite: a wealthy conservative and a high-educated centre-left(-liberal) elite, each represented by the old, established, 20th-century centre-left / centre-right party. Low-income groups, in this logic, will be represented – by populist parties.

The following graphics are (c) of:
Thomas Pikkety, Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality & the Changing Structure of Political Conflict (Evidence from France, Britain and the US, 1948-2017), WID.world WORKING PAPER SERIES N° 2018/7

Modi: a bibliography

Bharatiya Janata Party. Election Manifesto 2014. Ek Bharat: Shreshtha Bharat, Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas, New Delhi, BJP, 2014

Barnes, Tom. “Indian Labour Movements under Modi.” Gilded Age, edited by Ivan Franceschini and Nicholas Loubere, ANU Press, Australia, 2018, pp. 186–189. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvgd1hr.41.

Charrin, Eve « Inde, une croissance inéquitable », Alternatives économiques, vol. 346, no. 5, 2015, pp. 42-42.

Girish Patel. “Narendra Modi’s One-Day Cricket: What and Why?” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 37, no. 48, 2002, pp. 4826–4837. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/4412905.

Heuzé, Djallal Gérard. « Évolutions socioreligieuses en Inde. Entre durcissements et médiatisation », Revue Tiers Monde, vol. 204, no. 4, 2010, pp. 147-163.

Jaffrelot, C., Inde : national-populisme et démocratie ethnique, Paris, Fayard, 2019.

Jaffrelot, C. “L’Inde en route vers la démocratie ethnique”, in Alain Dieckhoff et Philippe Portier (dir.), Religion et Politique, (Collection « L’enjeu mondial »), Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2017, pp. 117 – 128.

— (2016) Narendra Modi between Hindutva and subnationalism: The Gujarati asmita of a Hindu Hriday Samrat, India Review, 15:2, 196-217, DOI: 10.1080/14736489.2016.1165557

— (2014) « Nationalisme hindou, libéralisme économique et populisme high-tech », Manière de voir, vol. 134, no. 4, 2014, pp. 44-44.

— (2008) « Le Gujarat de Narendra Modi : les leçons d’une victoire électorale », Critique internationale, vol. 40, no. 3, 2008, pp. 9-25.

— (2008) “Gujarat: The Meaning of Modi’s Victory.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 43, no. 15, 2008, pp. 12–17. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40277329.

— (2003)  « Les violences entre hindous et musulmans au Gujarat (Inde) en 2002 : émeutes d’état, pogromes et réaction antijihadiste », Revue Tiers Monde, vol. 174, no. 2, 2003, pp. 345-367.

C. Jaffrelot et Sanjay Kumar, “The Impact of Urbanization on the Electoral Results of the 2014 Indian Elections: With Special reference to the BJP Vote”, in « Understanding India’s 2014 Elections », Studies in Indian Politics, vol. 3, no 1, June 2015, pp.39-49.

Jenkins, R. et J. Manor, Politics and the right to work: India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, Londres, Hurst, 2017.

Jha, P., How the BJP wins. Inside India’s greatest election machine, Delhi, Juggernaut, 2017

Lokniti-CSDS, National Election Survey (NES), 2014. Adapté de C. Jaffrelot, “The
Class Element in the 2014 Indian Election and the BJP’s Success with Special Reference to
the Hindi Belt”, in « Understanding India’s 2014 Elections », Studies in Indian Politics, vol.
3, no 1, June 2015, pp. 19 – 38.

Saint-Mézard, Isabelle. « L’Inde de Modi : un « développement pour tous » », Politique étrangère, vol. Été, no. 2, 2018, pp. 79-88.

Sinha, Aseema « India’s New Porous State: Blurred Boundaries and the Evolving Business-State Relationship », in Christophe Jaffrelot, Atul Kohli and Kanta Murali (dir.), Business and Politics in India, New York, Oxford University Press, 2019.

Suhrud, Tridip. “Modi and Gujarati ‘Asmita’.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 43, no. 1, 2008, pp. 11–13. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40276435.

TELTUMBDE, ANAND. “Gujarat 2002 and Modi’s Misdeeds.” Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 47, no. 11, 2012, pp. 10–11. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23214644.

Thorat, S.K., “Dalits in Post-2014 India: Wide Gap between Promise and Action”, in A. Chatterji, T. Blom Hansen et C. Jaffrelot (eds), Majoritarian state. What Hindu nationalism is doing to India, Londres, Hurst, 2019.

Thaksin Shinawatra- in surveys

The nationwide survey by Assumption University’s Abac Poll Research Center showed that the Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s popularity has fallen to 45.9 percent, the lowest level inthree years and a sharp decline from when he overwhelmingly won re-election inFebruary 2005 after a landslide election victory and had a rating of 77.5percent. Thaksin’s reputation has suffered from corruption scandals and soaringworld oil prices that forced the government to reduce its subsidies forgasoline, causing fuel prices to rise to record highs.

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Imran Khan- in surveys

  • April 2017. Gallup Pakistan, the Pakistani affiliate of Gallup International conducted a Nationally Representative Survey of Adult Pakistanis on the Perceptions regarding the Panama Leaks Case and concluded that Imran Khan won apolitical and moral victory by raising the issue of corruption publicly and getting an audience with the highest court of the country. See detail
  • The Political Barometer 2015, conducted by the SustainableDevelopment Policy Institute found that Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf(PTI) was more popular than the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz(PML-N).  See detail

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Abe Shinzō

During an election campaign in Fukushima, eastern Japan.  –AP
After winning reelection as head of the Liberal Democratic Party, 20 Sep 2018
Abe speaks during the Global Leaders’ Meeting on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment at UN headquarters in September  – Carlo Allegri/Reuters
TurkishPresident Recep Tayyip Erdogan hugs Prime Minister Shinzo Abe after a newsconference in Istanbul in November 2015. –Reuters